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Abstract
This paper examines a process of order submissions and cancellations in
the interbank order driven market of the EUR/PLN currency pair. Our con-
tribution to the existing literature is twofold. We generalize the Asymmetric
ACD model (AACD) of Bauwens & Giot (2003) with respect to more than
two competing risks. It results in the ﬂexible multistate econometric model
for durations between moments in which order submissions or cancellations
take place. Thanks to the Multistate AACD model we are able to examine
timing of order submissions/cancellations that (1) take place on diﬀerent sides
of the market and (2) vary according to the level of order aggressiveness. We
show how to simulate from the proposed Multistate Asymmetric ACD model,
which enables us to study the transition probabilities between selected events.
We investigate diﬀerent market microstructure factors that exert an inﬂuence
on the intraday pattern of order submission or cancellation strategies.
JEL classiﬁcation: G10,F30,C30
Keywords: asymmetric ACD model, order dynamics, intraday liquidityIntroduction
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1 Introduction
Order dynamics is an important foundation for the quality of an order-driven market.
The various factors that determine whether or not to place an order of a particular
type at a particular moment inﬂuence the process whereby liquidity is supplied to the
market via limit orders or is demanded from the market via market orders. Through
detailed insight into the behavior of market participants it is also possible to un-
derstand the process of price formation. The disclosure of factors that determine
the ﬂuctuation of liquidity is of primary importance for both market clients and for
regulators as an undesirable liquidity squeeze can lead to extreme and undesirable
price movements as seen during the most recent ﬁnancial turmoil of 2008-2009.
The paper analyzes the process of order submissions and cancellations in the inter-
bank order driven market of the EUR/PLN currency pair. In order to capture the
entirety of the dynamics of the order book, we present a generalized version of the
Asymmetric ACD model that we will call the Multistate Asymmetric ACD model
(MAACD). Within this wider setup we are able to describe the expected durations
between moments when orders, classiﬁed according to selected “classes of aggres-
siveness”, will arrive to the market or will be withdrawn from it. Thus, we are able
to diﬀerentiate between potential factors governing the pace at which liquidity is
exhausted or is replenished. Our work has been inspired by the empirical study of
Lo & Sapp (2008) where the intraday mixture of best limit orders and market orders
was analyzed by means of the standard asymmetric ACD model of Bauwens & Giot
(2003). The study tests the impact of diﬀerent factors not only on whether a trader
chooses a particular order type but also on the timing of such a decision. The inclu-
sion of time in the modeling framework allows the user to investigate time-varying
preferences with regard to the arrival of particular orders in a continuously changing
market environment. The precedence of market orders over limit orders (or vice
versa) and the order clustering eﬀects have been investigated from the perspective
of time-varying liquidity and information-related market characteristics.
In this paper our goal is to further develop the work of Lo & Sapp (2008) in an eﬀort
to contribute to the empirical literature on order dynamics in two main dimensions.
First, as opposed to Lo & Sapp (2008), we do not focus only on the best orders
submitted within the system (i.e. market orders or best limit orders). Instead,
we take into account all of the orders that enter into the trading system and we
classify them according to their level of aggressiveness (i.e. the likelihood of being
executed). Second, we model both sides of the order book jointly and simultaneously
1
diﬀerentiate between the bid and ask sides of the market. Such a modelling strategy
allows us to account for the possible endogeneity among diﬀerent moments where
buy and/or sell orders are posted or cancelled. Additionally, we demonstrate how to
easily simulate from the MAACD model. Such a simulation algorithm can be helpful
if we want to test the properties of the model. For example, we can easily simulate
a most probable sequence according to which orders enter the market or are with-
drawn from it. The obtained transition probability estimates can be compared with
the existing theoretical (see Parlour (1998); Foucault (1999) and Goettler, Parlour
& Rajan (2005)) or empirical (see Biais (1995); Hall & Hautsch (2006) and Hall &
Hautsch (2007)) results from the literature concerning order book dynamics. With
the application of the MAACD model we are also able to investigate how the arrival
time of orders will relate to each other when they are (1) characterized by diﬀering
levels of aggressiveness and are (2) posted on diﬀerent market sides. We also enrich
our model with a variety of explanatory variables reﬂecting a continually changing
market environment as well as the state of the order book. We then verify their im-
pact on trader decisions with respect to the type of order placed and the time of such
a submission or cancellation. This modelling framework allows us to verify selected
theoretical microstructure hypotheses in a more explicit manner. Our model is very
much related to the studies of Hall & Hautsch (2006) and Hall & Hautsch (2007)
where the multidimensional autoregressive conditional intensity (ACI) function has
been developed in order to account for the instantaneous arrival rates of diﬀerent
order types. In a close analogy to the multidimensional ACI model, the MAACD
model can also account for the complex dynamics of the order book. Both mod-
els can describe the arrival rates characterizing particular classes of orders as well
as the interdependence between these individual processes. Therefore, our eﬀort is
to apply another ﬂexible econometric speciﬁcation that can adequately describe a
complicated intertemporal game of order submissions while at the same time being
tractable and easy to estimate and/or to simulate.
The second aim of our analysis is to enrich what is currently a very scarce area of
literature concerning the microstructure of currency markets in emerging economies.
From the econometric viewpoint, the process of order submissions and cancellations
in our modeling approach is reﬂected as an ordered point process. Accordingly, we
model the temporal accelerations and/or decelerations in the pace of dealer activity
with the highest resolution possible. In fact, the driving forces for order ﬂow in our
study are much diﬀerent than those for stocks or major currency markets. Clearly,
zloty and euro are not treated as substitutes with regards to level of risk undertaken;
2Introduction
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thus, the willingness to invest in emerging market currencies is closely linked to the
changes in global risk aversion versus the risk appetite as well as to the fundamental
foundings of the Polish economy as compared to the other CE3 members (i.e. Hun-
gary and the Czech Republic).
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we introduce the theoretical ar-
gumentation for our model. We present a survey of the theoretical and empirical
literature that deals with diﬀerent aspects of order submission regularities. We also
touch on the fact that there are market microstructure hypotheses that refer to se-
lected factors which impact order choice. In the section 3 we present the Reuters
Dealing 3000 Spot Matching System and we introduce the data to be used in the
empirical study. Section 4 contains the theoretical econometric background for the
speciﬁcations of the Multistate Asymmetric ACD model. In the sections 5 and 6 we
present the results of the empirical analysis. The conclusion sums up the results of
the study and comments their importance.
2 Literature Overview and Economic Hypotheses
There is a large strand of literature that underlines the informative content of time
as one of the latent factors that inﬂuences the behavior of market participants. The
theoretical microstructure models that implicitly entwine the concept of time date
back to studies of Admati & Pﬂeiderer (1988), Diamond & Verrecchia (1987) and
Easley & O’Hara (1992). In the ﬁrst model, ﬂuctuations in trading activity signal
the arrival of new information. When trading intensity is high it is easier for in-
formed traders to hide their strategic intensions. Simultaneously, liquidity traders
(uninformed traders) who are discretionary (i.e. they can choose the periods in
which they trade) also prefer to trade in such heavy periods as their activity does
not induce undesirable price movements. On the other hand, periods of slow trading
where there are no discretionary liquidity traders in the market is an area where
there will be a relatively large fraction of informed traders present. This hypoth-
esis is often described in the literature as “slow trading means informed trading”.
Informational content of trade activity is also underlined in the model of Easley &
O’Hara (1992). In their approach, periods of increased trading signal the presence of
informed traders; thus, their model is often described as“no trade means no news”.
In the model of Diamond & Verrecchia (1987), due to the presence of the short
selling restrictions in some capital markets, informed traders cannot speculate on
bad information. Therefore, if the bad news arrives trading activity declines. The
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essence of this phenomenon is often described as“no trading means bad information”.
The aforementioned models underline the importance of time in explaining various
strategic information-motivated intentions of market participants. The theoretical
framework refers to a price-driven market with a single market maker. On the other
hand, much theoretical research has also been carried out in order to fully under-
stand the order submission strategies in an automated order-driven market (limit
order market). Such trading mechanisms have gained in importance over the last
decade and today limit order markets dominate trading in stocks and foreign ex-
change markets1. In the automated order-driven markets, dealers willing to trade
can enter either a market order which is immediately executed at the prevailing
bid or ask quotes or they can post a limit order that waits for a given time period
for execution at a more favorable price. Market orders were initially perceived as
information-motivated. Since superior information can quickly lose its value, the
use of market orders always guarantees an immediate execution. Limit orders are
perceived as patient, passive and liquidity-motivated (e.g. Glosten (1994) and Seppi
(1997)). Most recently the conviction about sole informational content of market
orders has been challenged and there is a widespread notion that limit orders and
the whole process of the liquidity provision can be also initiated by informed traders
(e.g. Bloomfeld, O’Hara & Saar (2005); Anand, Chakravarty & Martell (2005) and
Hasbrouck & Saar (2009)). The decision to post a limit order is always associated
with a trade-oﬀ between the potential gain from obtaining a better price and the
potential risk of either non-execution or being “picked-oﬀ”. With a limit order a
trader can get a better price; however, there is also the risk that the order may
never be executed. On the other hand, as the price of limit orders are ﬁxed, there
is an additional risk that the orders may become mispriced when new information
arrives. This adverse selection risk may lead to losses if a limit order is executed at
an unfavorable price. The dilemma is determining what kind of order to choose and
when to submit a given order. All of this provides the basis for numerous theoretical
and empirical research studies on the dynamics of a limit order book.
Theoretical dynamic equilibrium models that describe the order choice problem as
a sort of a multi-agent bargaining game have been formulated by Parlour (1998),
Foucault (1999), Foucault, Kadan & Kandel (2005), Goettler et al. (2005) and Rosu
(2009). In the ﬁrst two studies some testable hypotheses with regard to the process
of order submissions have been formulated. In Parlour (1998), the individual order
1Examples of limit order books are: the Euronext Paris, the SEAQ or the NASDAQ (stock markets),
the Reuters Dealing 3000 and the EBS (currency pairs) and the MTS (bonds).
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choices depend on the state of the order book and the awaited arrival rate of market
orders over the remainder of the day. Traders in this case anticipate the aftereﬀects
of their actions on other market participants. Even if there is no information-based
incentive to trade in this model, some regularities in the patterns of order submission
can be obtained. Parlour (1998) predicts that after a market buy (sell), the most
probable order would be limit sell (buy). It is because the payoﬀ of a limit sell (buy)
order (the utility gain) depends on the probability of execution. If the probability
rises after a market buy (sell), the order book will be reduced by at least one unit
on the ask (bid) side. The limit sell (buy) will gain the priority of execution and
thus it will be more proﬁtable. Such a phenomenon has been named “a crowding
out eﬀect”because orders of a given type that are submitted on one side of the order
book “crowd out” other orders by making them unattractive. Accordingly, market
orders submitted on the ask (bid) side of the market are crosscorrelated with limit
orders on the bid (ask) side of the market. This regularity is summed up by the
following hypothesis:
• H1: The probability of observing a limit sell (limit buy) order is larger if the
previous transaction was a market buy (market sell), than if it was a market
sell (market buy).
Another hypothesis has been formulated with regard to market orders. Once a
market buy (sell) order is observed, a limit sell (buy) order allows for a higher utility
gain than a market sell (buy). Traders who want to sell would rather choose limit
sells than market sells. Thus, the liquidity provision is more proﬁtable on the ask
side of the market. This is another type of a the“crowding out eﬀect”which predicts
serial correlation in the order ﬂow. This clustering of market orders on one market
side can arise either from pure liquidity dynamics or from informed trading. Thus,
a second hypothesis:
• H2: The probability of a market sell (market buy) is larger if the previous
transaction was a market sell (market buy) than if it was a market buy (market
sell).
The aforementioned hypotheses are based on the assumption that traders optimize
their order choice with regard to (1) the state of the order book (which is determined
by the past behavior of traders), and (2) the anticipated actions of other rational
traders. The “crowding out mechanism” can also be used to formulate hypotheses
that relate directly to the depth of the order book (see also in Hall & Hautsch (2006)
and Hall & Hautsch (2007). Thus, a third hypothesis:
5Literature Overview and Economic Hypotheses
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5 • H3: Increase in the depth on the ask (bid) side increases the aggressiveness of
market trading on the ask (bid) side.
The rationale behind this hypothesis is this: a limit order placed in a book has a
lower probability of execution when there are already many orders standing in front
of it. Accordingly, the contemporaneous mixture of orders will be shifted toward
market orders.
Some regularity with regard to the order sequencing has been discovered from the
stochastic sequential model of Goettler et al. (2005). In this very general modeling
setup, traders can submit multiple limit orders at diﬀerent prices and trade diﬀerent
quantities. The generalization of this model comes with a cost and the equilibrium
must be solved numerically. The simulation results depict a“diagonal eﬀect”, which
means that market buys are more probable after market buys then after market
sells. This agrees with the second hypothesis (H2). Moreover, market orders are
often followed by limit orders on the same side of a market. The logic is that after
an increase (decrease) of the consensus value of an asset, sell (buy) orders become
mispriced. This induces a ﬂow of buy (sell) market orders that“pick oﬀ”these limit
orders.
In the dynamic equilibrium model of Foucault (1999), the proportion of limit to
market orders depends on the volatility of an asset. An increase in the fundamental
risk of an investment magniﬁes the risk of being picked-oﬀ. Thus, the reservation
prices of limit orders become less aggressive and the bid-ask spread widens. As a
consequence of this, the use of market orders becomes more expensive and traders
opt for limit orders. The mixture of orders shifts in favor of limit orders but the
trading activity declines. In this case the following hypotheses arise:
• H4: An increase in the bid-ask spread decreases the probability of a market
order and increases the probability of an aggressive limit order.
• H5: An increase in the volatility decreases the probability of a market order
and increases the probability of an aggressive limit order.
In the dynamic equilibrium model of Foucault et al. (2005) the concept of time has
been introduced through the cost of waiting. The proportion of market and limit or-
ders depends on a trade-oﬀ between the cost of immediacy (the bid-ask spread) and
the cost of delayed execution (the waiting costs). Within this framework, waiting
costs are proportional to the time required for traders to complete their transactions.
Therefore, the increase in waiting cost prompts liquidity suppliers to bid or to ask
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more aggressively. This logic supports the ﬁfth hypothesis (H5). According to the
model, the amount by which traders improve upon the prevailing quotes depends on
the size of the bid-ask spread.
In order-driven markets, the risk embedded in limit orders can be limited by an
appropriate monitoring market information. Once the submitted orders become
mispriced traders can always cancel or revise them in order to mitigate the free-
option risk or the risk of no-execution. The literature provides many examples of
information-motivated cancellations of limit orders. Hasbrouck & Saar (2009) doc-
ument that over one-third of nonmarketable limit orders for NASDAQ-listed stocks
on the INET are cancelled within two seconds. They show that the use of such
“ﬂeeting orders”is a very recent phenomenon that stems from improved technology
and the active trading culture. Fong & Liu (2010) show that order revisions gen-
erate a net economic beneﬁt for market participants and that the process of order
cancellations/revisions is based on the continual monitoring of market conditions.
Liu (2009) proposes a formal model where the relationship between order submis-
sion risks and cancellation/revision activity has been investigated. He predicts that
if the bid-ask spread widens then the cancellation rates will fall. If the bid-ask
spread is large the expected cost of execution of an limit order at an undesirable
price as well as the expected cost of non-execution is low. The same relationship
is predicted by Hasbrouck & Saar (2009). According to their “cost-of-immediacy”
hypothesis, if the cost of immediate execution (i.e. the bid-ask spread) decreases,
the“gravitational pull”of immediate execution with a market order rises. The limit
orders that were placed inside the quotes and were not purely liquidity-motivated
are then are changed to market orders. Thus, we have a sixth hypothesis:
• H6: A decrease in the bid-ask spread increases the probability of a limit order
cancellation.
In agreement with the model described by Foucault (1999), cancellation activity
should be also higher if volatility rises. Large and unpredictable swings of the ex-
change rate increase the risk that the order will be mispriced (the free option risk of
a limit order); thus, we predict that the following hypothesis should be true:
• H7: An increase in the volatility increases the probability of a limit order
cancellation.
The availability of high-resolution quote datasets has spurred an interest in empir-
ical veriﬁcation of the hypotheses stated above. There is a large body of empirical
literature that deals with the impact of diﬀerent market conditions on order choice
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in limit order markets (Bae, Jang & Park (2003); Ranaldo (2004); Verhoeven, Ching
& Ng (2003); Pascual & Veredas (2004); Ellul, Holden, Jain & Jennings (2007); Lo
& Sapp (2008); and others). The empirical analysis of Biais (1995) is one of the ﬁrst
studies on this matter. The study investigates order sequences on the Paris Bourse
and ﬁnds some systematic patterns. For example, it empirically demonstrates “the
diagonal eﬀect”, which is the clustering of orders of the same type. Biais (1995)
proposes following explanations for this. First, traders may split large orders into
small ones in an eﬀort to limit a price reaction. Second, traders may imitate other
traders’ behavior (“piggyback”). Third, traders may indeed react to selected mar-
ket events in a similar way. Although the ﬁndings of Biais (1995) spurred serious
interest in conﬁrming such regularities within diﬀerent markets, the majority of the
econometric tools that have been applied were strictly static in nature. The studies
of Verhoeven et al. (2003); Ranaldo (2004) and Ellul et al. (2007) use logit regres-
sions. Such speciﬁcations can adequately account for numerous exogenous factors
that have an impact on the order choice; however, they cannot take into account
the role of time variation between order submissions. Trading needs do not occur
synchronically among traders and they may be evoked by the actions taken by other
market participants2. Static models do not account for the casual eﬀects such as
possible spill-overs between the arrival rates of various order types exist. Moreover,
nearly all of the empirical ﬁndings that have been reported depict stock markets;
there are only a few exceptions devoted to currency trading (Bloomfeld et al. (2005),
Lo & Sapp (2008)).
3 Market and Data
The FX market of the Polish Zloty is the most liquid among all the currency markets
of the Central European emerging economies3. Spot transactions can be executed
on the OTC market using the Reuters Dealing Direct system, via a voice broker or
by telephone. About half of all trades is conducted via the Reuters Dealing 3000
Spot Matching System (RDSMS) and the importance of this platform is continually
2This is most pronounced in the automated FX markets where, based upon the information obtained
from FX dealers, about 80% of trades are purely speculative in their motivation. The remainder
are motivated by real trading needs.
3According to the survey of FX market activity conducted by the Bank for International Settlements
BIS (2007), the average daily turnover in interbank spot transactions amounted to 4,851 million
USD in April 2007. This market is, therefore, nearly two times bigger than the spot market for the
Hungarian Forint where the average daily turnover amounted to 2,959 million USD in April 2007
and about three times more liquid than the market for the Czech Koruna (1,630 million USD).
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growing over the subsequent years. It is a very liquid and transparent electronic bro-
kerage system, operating as an order-driven market that can automatically match
incoming buy and sell orders once their prices agree. FX dealers can submit either
limit or market orders; market orders are perceived as liquidity-consuming and ag-
gressive since they are immediately executed against most competitive limit orders
in the order book. As far as the transparency of the system is concerned, traders
can observe continually changing best ask and bid prices that correspond to the
most competitive buy and sell limit orders stored in the order book. They can also
see the whole size of best ask and best bid limit orders (the depth at the best ask
and the depth at the best bid) but only if this size does not exceed 10 M. EUR.
If it is the case, the quantity of the whole depth is hidden and the sign “R” (regu-
lar order) appears next to the best ask or the best bid quotation. Such a solution
allows for the size of large orders submitted to the system at the best prices to be
hidden. Traders can see neither the price nor the quantity of all other (less compet-
itive) orders placed in the system. Unlike the EUR/USD currency pair, traders also
cannot see the potential price at which 10 M. EUR could be traded. Nevertheless,
traders have the possibility of observing the continually changing price of all of the
executed transactions with corresponding indicators “P” or “T”. This allows them
to deduce whether the trade was “Paid” (initiated by an ask side, hence a market
sell) or “Taken” (initiated by a bid side, henceforth a market buy). Although the
exact volume of trades is not able to be seen, market participants can gain a certain
intuition about the changes in the order ﬂow via the observed quantities of executed
orders.
The datasets used in this study comprise market and limit orders submitted to the
system or cancelled from the market between 2 Jan 2007 and 31 Jan 2007. The
EUR/PLN exchange rate is quoted as a quantity of Zlotys per one Euro. During
the period of study, the Zloty followed an appreciating trend towards Euro. Trading
of the Polish Zloty takes place within oﬀshore markets (i.e. London banks) as well
as within Poland4 and the datasets cover both of these trading venues. Every order
includes an exact date and time of submission as well as an execution/cancellation
indicator, a ﬁrm quote, a size and an indicator for the market side of a quote. The
detailed structure of the datasets makes it possible to rebuild the entire order book
at each moment of market activity. In ﬁgure 3 we present the exemplary state of the
order book on 18 January, 16:13 CET. In this particular snapshot, the whole depth
4About 80% of the turnover takes place in the oﬀshore market and the remaining 20% are trades
between banks located within Poland.
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on the ask market side (sell limit orders) amounts to 22 M. EUR (the depth at the
best ask that is visible to traders equals 2 M. EUR) whereas the depth on the bid
market side (buy limit orders) equals 15 M. EUR (the depth at the best bid that is
visible to traders equals 2 M. EUR).
Although trading on the interbank market can take place 24 hours a day and 7 days
a week, it is heavily concentrated on working days between 8:00 and 18:00 Central
European Time (GMT+1, with Daylight Savings Time). The amount of orders
submitted beyond these time frames is quite negligible (see ﬁgure 3). In order to
limit the undesired impact of periods where trading is particularly thin, we exclude
observations registered on weekends and on working days between 18:00 and 8:00
CET5.
Figure 1: A snapshot of the order book for the EUR/PLN currency pair. The stepwise lines
depict the ask (upper line) and bid (lower line) slope curves.
5A similar truncation procedure has also been performed in the study of Lo & Sapp (2008).
10
on the ask market side (sell limit orders) amounts to 22 M. EUR (the depth at the
best ask that is visible to traders equals 2 M. EUR) whereas the depth on the bid
market side (buy limit orders) equals 15 M. EUR (the depth at the best bid that is
visible to traders equals 2 M. EUR).
Although trading on the interbank market can take place 24 hours a day and 7 days
a week, it is heavily concentrated on working days between 8:00 and 18:00 Central
European Time (GMT+1, with Daylight Savings Time). The amount of orders
submitted beyond these time frames is quite negligible (see ﬁgure 3). In order to
limit the undesired impact of periods where trading is particularly thin, we exclude
observations registered on weekends and on working days between 18:00 and 8:00
CET5.
Figure 1: A snapshot of the order book for the EUR/PLN currency pair. The stepwise lines
depict the ask (upper line) and bid (lower line) slope curves.
5A similar truncation procedure has also been performed in the study of Lo & Sapp (2008).
10
growing over the subsequent years. It is a very liquid and transparent electronic bro-
kerage system, operating as an order-driven market that can automatically match
incoming buy and sell orders once their prices agree. FX dealers can submit either
limit or market orders; market orders are perceived as liquidity-consuming and ag-
gressive since they are immediately executed against most competitive limit orders
in the order book. As far as the transparency of the system is concerned, traders
can observe continually changing best ask and bid prices that correspond to the
most competitive buy and sell limit orders stored in the order book. They can also
see the whole size of best ask and best bid limit orders (the depth at the best ask
and the depth at the best bid) but only if this size does not exceed 10 M. EUR.
If it is the case, the quantity of the whole depth is hidden and the sign “R” (regu-
lar order) appears next to the best ask or the best bid quotation. Such a solution
allows for the size of large orders submitted to the system at the best prices to be
hidden. Traders can see neither the price nor the quantity of all other (less compet-
itive) orders placed in the system. Unlike the EUR/USD currency pair, traders also
cannot see the potential price at which 10 M. EUR could be traded. Nevertheless,
traders have the possibility of observing the continually changing price of all of the
executed transactions with corresponding indicators “P” or “T”. This allows them
to deduce whether the trade was “Paid” (initiated by an ask side, hence a market
sell) or “Taken” (initiated by a bid side, henceforth a market buy). Although the
exact volume of trades is not able to be seen, market participants can gain a certain
intuition about the changes in the order ﬂow via the observed quantities of executed
orders.
The datasets used in this study comprise market and limit orders submitted to the
system or cancelled from the market between 2 Jan 2007 and 31 Jan 2007. The
EUR/PLN exchange rate is quoted as a quantity of Zlotys per one Euro. During
the period of study, the Zloty followed an appreciating trend towards Euro. Trading
of the Polish Zloty takes place within oﬀshore markets (i.e. London banks) as well
as within Poland4 and the datasets cover both of these trading venues. Every order
includes an exact date and time of submission as well as an execution/cancellation
indicator, a ﬁrm quote, a size and an indicator for the market side of a quote. The
detailed structure of the datasets makes it possible to rebuild the entire order book
at each moment of market activity. In ﬁgure 3 we present the exemplary state of the
order book on 18 January, 16:13 CET. In this particular snapshot, the whole depth
4About 80% of the turnover takes place in the oﬀshore market and the remaining 20% are trades
between banks located within Poland.
9
Figure 2: Intraday frequency of order submissions (left panel) and order cancellations (right
panel).
All of the incoming orders have been categorized according to their level of aggres-
siveness as in the studies of Hall & Hautsch (2006) and Ellul et al. (2007). In the
analysis we also included cancellations of best buy and sell limit orders. Our sample
covers 92,818 selected events and each of them fall into the one of ten categories:
• k = 1 (MS) – Submission of a market sell order or a marketable limit sell
order; in this case the price of the incoming sell order is lower or equal to
the most competitive bid price prevailing in the order book. Such orders are
immediately executed against the limit orders stored on the bid side of the
order book. There are 10,808 MS order submissions in the sample.
• k = 2 (IQS)– Submission of an inside-the-quote limit sell order; in this case
the price of the incoming sell order is lower than the best ask price but higher
than the best bid price. Such orders improve the best ask price. There are
14,395 IQS order submissions in the sample.
• k = 3 (AQS) – Submission of an at-the-quote limit sell order; in this case the
price of the incoming sell order is equal to the best ask price prevailing in the
system. These orders increase the depth at the best ask. There are 4,871 AQS
order submissions in the sample.
• k = 4 (BQS) – Submission of a behind-the-quote limit sell order; in this case
the price of the sell order is higher than the lowest (most competitive) ask
price in the order book. There are 9,308 BQS order submissions in the sample.
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• k = 5 (CS) – Cancellation of an inside-the-quote or an at-the-quote limit sell
order. There are 7,429 CS events in the sample6.
• k = 6 (MB) – Submission of a market buy order or a marketable limit buy
order; in this case the price of the incoming buy order is greater then or equal
to the lowest (most competitive) ask price in the order book. Such orders are
immediately executed against limit orders stored on the ask side of the order
book. There are 11,069 MB order submissions.
• k = 7 (IQB) – Submission of an inside-the-quote limit buy order; in this case
the price of the incoming buy order is lower than the best ask price but is
higher than the best bid price. Such orders improve the best bid price. There
are 14,239 IQB order submissions.
• k = 8 (AQB) – Submission of an at-the-quote limit buy order; in this case the
price of the incoming buy order is equal to the price of the best buy limit order
prevailing in the book. Such orders increase the depth at the best bid. There
are 4,231 AQB order submissions.
• k = 9 (BQB) – Submission of a behind-the-quote limit buy order; in this case
the price of the incoming buy order is lower than the best bid price. There are
9,188 BQB order submissions.
• k = 10 (CB) – Cancellation of an inside-the-quote or an at-the-quote limit buy
order. There are 7,280 CB events in the sample.
4 The Econometric Approach
In a very close analogy to Bauwens & Giot (2003), we consider the model for the
marked point process {xi,y i}, where xi = ti−ti−1 is a duration between the moments
in which subsequent orders arrive to the system or are withdrawn from it and yi is
an indicator variable for a particular type of an event yi = k (where k =1 ,2,...,10)7.
6We include cancellations of best limit sell and best limit ask orders since they are believed to have
greater informational content then cancellations of behind-the-quote orders. In this way we do not
cover cancellations of orders that have “moved away” from the market price and were perhaps left
in the system for a very long time. Their removal from the system does not bring much insight
into either the process of price formation or liquidity provision in comparison to the behavior of
best limit orders.
7Although a subset of natural numbers is applied to deﬁne a discrete process yi ∈
{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}, the numbers are used as qualitative indicators in order to discriminate
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At the end of each duration xi one of ten possible states: MS, IQS, AQS, BQS, CS,
MB, IQB, AQB, BQB or CB can be observed. Accordingly, xi can be treated as an
outcome variable of a function xi = min(xi,1,x i,2,...,xi,10), where each of variables
xi,k (for k =1 ,2,...,10) corresponds to an order duration that would end up in the
state k. As in the standard framework of a competing risks model, only the short-
est from ten possible durations is observed (realized), which happens if an order of
a corresponding type enters the system or is cancelled from it. For example, if a
MS order (yi = 1) were posted, only the MS duration xi,1 would be observed at ti.
Other durations that would have ended up in other states (i.e. IQS, AQS, BQS, CS,
MB, IQB, AQB, BQB and CB durations) would be therefore unobservable and are
treated as censored by the arrival of the MS order at time ti.
As in the standard framework of a competing risks model, we consider a joint con-








where Ik is a dummy variable (Ik
i = 1 if a state yi = k is observed at time ti and
Ik
i = 0 if a state yi �= k is observed at time ti). Fi−1 denotes an information set up
to a time point t−1 that contains past realizations of xi and yi, hxk and Sxk denote
a hazard and a survival function for xk, respectively.
The duration that is realized (observed) contributes to the joint conditional density
function given by equation (1) via its density function, whereas other unrealized
(censored) durations contribute to it via their survival functions. For example, if a
state MS is observed at ti, the conditional bivariate density of the pair {xi,y i} is
given by:










Therefore, if a duration xi ends with an MS order (yi = 1), xi contributes to
the density function via: (1) the conditional density of xi,1 evaluated at xi, i.e.
selected events. Accordingly, natural ordering of yk does not have any informative meaning in the
context of this model.
8The model assumes independence (conditionally on Fi−1) between durations xi,1,x i,2,...,xi,10.
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• k = 5 (CS) – Cancellation of an inside-the-quote or an at-the-quote limit sell
order. There are 7,429 CS events in the sample6.
• k = 6 (MB) – Submission of a market buy order or a marketable limit buy
order; in this case the price of the incoming buy order is greater then or equal
to the lowest (most competitive) ask price in the order book. Such orders are
immediately executed against limit orders stored on the ask side of the order
book. There are 11,069 MB order submissions.
• k = 7 (IQB) – Submission of an inside-the-quote limit buy order; in this case
the price of the incoming buy order is lower than the best ask price but is
higher than the best bid price. Such orders improve the best bid price. There
are 14,239 IQB order submissions.
• k = 8 (AQB) – Submission of an at-the-quote limit buy order; in this case the
price of the incoming buy order is equal to the price of the best buy limit order
prevailing in the book. Such orders increase the depth at the best bid. There
are 4,231 AQB order submissions.
• k = 9 (BQB) – Submission of a behind-the-quote limit buy order; in this case
the price of the incoming buy order is lower than the best bid price. There are
9,188 BQB order submissions.
• k = 10 (CB) – Cancellation of an inside-the-quote or an at-the-quote limit buy
order. There are 7,280 CB events in the sample.
4 The Econometric Approach
In a very close analogy to Bauwens & Giot (2003), we consider the model for the
marked point process {xi,y i}, where xi = ti−ti−1 is a duration between the moments
in which subsequent orders arrive to the system or are withdrawn from it and yi is
an indicator variable for a particular type of an event yi = k (where k =1 ,2,...,10)7.
6We include cancellations of best limit sell and best limit ask orders since they are believed to have
greater informational content then cancellations of behind-the-quote orders. In this way we do not
cover cancellations of orders that have “moved away” from the market price and were perhaps left
in the system for a very long time. Their removal from the system does not bring much insight
into either the process of price formation or liquidity provision in comparison to the behavior of
best limit orders.
7Although a subset of natural numbers is applied to deﬁne a discrete process yi ∈
{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}, the numbers are used as qualitative indicators in order to discriminate
12
• k = 5 (CS) – Cancellation of an inside-the-quote or an at-the-quote limit sell
order. There are 7,429 CS events in the sample6.
• k = 6 (MB) – Submission of a market buy order or a marketable limit buy
order; in this case the price of the incoming buy order is greater then or equal
to the lowest (most competitive) ask price in the order book. Such orders are
immediately executed against limit orders stored on the ask side of the order
book. There are 11,069 MB order submissions.
• k = 7 (IQB) – Submission of an inside-the-quote limit buy order; in this case
the price of the incoming buy order is lower than the best ask price but is
higher than the best bid price. Such orders improve the best bid price. There
are 14,239 IQB order submissions.
• k = 8 (AQB) – Submission of an at-the-quote limit buy order; in this case the
price of the incoming buy order is equal to the price of the best buy limit order
prevailing in the book. Such orders increase the depth at the best bid. There
are 4,231 AQB order submissions.
• k = 9 (BQB) – Submission of a behind-the-quote limit buy order; in this case
the price of the incoming buy order is lower than the best bid price. There are
9,188 BQB order submissions.
• k = 10 (CB) – Cancellation of an inside-the-quote or an at-the-quote limit buy
order. There are 7,280 CB events in the sample.
4 The Econometric Approach
In a very close analogy to Bauwens & Giot (2003), we consider the model for the
marked point process {xi,y i}, where xi = ti−ti−1 is a duration between the moments
in which subsequent orders arrive to the system or are withdrawn from it and yi is
an indicator variable for a particular type of an event yi = k (where k =1 ,2,...,10)7.
6We include cancellations of best limit sell and best limit ask orders since they are believed to have
greater informational content then cancellations of behind-the-quote orders. In this way we do not
cover cancellations of orders that have “moved away” from the market price and were perhaps left
in the system for a very long time. Their removal from the system does not bring much insight
into either the process of price formation or liquidity provision in comparison to the behavior of
best limit orders.
7Although a subset of natural numbers is applied to deﬁne a discrete process yi ∈
{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}, the numbers are used as qualitative indicators in order to discriminate
12The Econometric Approach
WORKING PAPER No. 104 17
4
At the end of each duration xi one of ten possible states: MS, IQS, AQS, BQS, CS,
MB, IQB, AQB, BQB or CB can be observed. Accordingly, xi can be treated as an
outcome variable of a function xi = min(xi,1,x i,2,...,xi,10), where each of variables
xi,k (for k =1 ,2,...,10) corresponds to an order duration that would end up in the
state k. As in the standard framework of a competing risks model, only the short-
est from ten possible durations is observed (realized), which happens if an order of
a corresponding type enters the system or is cancelled from it. For example, if a
MS order (yi = 1) were posted, only the MS duration xi,1 would be observed at ti.
Other durations that would have ended up in other states (i.e. IQS, AQS, BQS, CS,
MB, IQB, AQB, BQB and CB durations) would be therefore unobservable and are
treated as censored by the arrival of the MS order at time ti.
As in the standard framework of a competing risks model, we consider a joint con-








where Ik is a dummy variable (Ik
i = 1 if a state yi = k is observed at time ti and
Ik
i = 0 if a state yi �= k is observed at time ti). Fi−1 denotes an information set up
to a time point t−1 that contains past realizations of xi and yi, hxk and Sxk denote
a hazard and a survival function for xk, respectively.
The duration that is realized (observed) contributes to the joint conditional density
function given by equation (1) via its density function, whereas other unrealized
(censored) durations contribute to it via their survival functions. For example, if a
state MS is observed at ti, the conditional bivariate density of the pair {xi,y i} is
given by:










Therefore, if a duration xi ends with an MS order (yi = 1), xi contributes to
the density function via: (1) the conditional density of xi,1 evaluated at xi, i.e.
selected events. Accordingly, natural ordering of yk does not have any informative meaning in the
context of this model.
8The model assumes independence (conditionally on Fi−1) between durations xi,1,x i,2,...,xi,10.
13
fx1(xi|Fi−1) and (2) the joint conditional probability that all other unobserved du-
rations xi,k (with end states k =2 ,...,10) are longer than the realized duration xi:
￿10
k=2 Sxk(xi|Fi−1).
The conditional hazard and survival functions for each of selected durations xi,k
are speciﬁed with the Logarithmic ACD models with a Weibull distribution of an
error term (see Bauwens & Giot (2000)). The conditional duration expectations
are speciﬁed in a dynamic fashion, such as previous states and previously observed
durations could exert an inﬂuence on their length. In the standard framework of the
ACD model xi,k is given as:
xi,k =Φ i,kεi,k (3)
where Φi,k =Ψ i,k · µ−1
εi ,Ψ i,k = E(xi,k|Fi−1) and µεi is the mean of the Wiebull
distribution9, εi,k is a Weibull-distributed error term (εi,k ∼ i.i.d. W(γk,1), where
γk is a shape parameter and a dispersion parameter is restricted to 1). Conditional
(with respect to Fi−1) duration expectations are modelled with the Log-ACD model




(ωl,k + αl,k lnxi−1)I
l




(ωl,k + αl,k lnxi−1,l)I
l
i−1 + βkψi−1,k
where l =1 ,2,...,10 and Il
i is a dummy indicator (Il
i = 1, if a state yi = l at the end
of duration xi and Il
i = 0, if yi �= l ).
The econometric speciﬁcations of duration expectations according to the previously
realized state of yi. Thus, the expected waiting times till particular order submis-
sions or cancellations will take place vary with the type of the previously observed
events and the time that had elapsed until they occurred.
Assuming the Weibull distribution for the error terms εi,k, the joint conditional



















9An exposition of the Weibull distribution and some major properties of the MAACD model were
provided in the Appendix.
10Detailed properties of the Log-ACD models can be found in Bauwens, Galli & Giot (2008).
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Θk,Θ k = {ωl,k,α l,k,β k,γ k} (for l =1 ,2,...,10). Because there are no
relations between the parameters from the distinct subsets Θk (as durations xi,k are
independent conditionally on Fi−1), we are able to estimate the model by separately
maximizing ten log-likelihoods: lnLk(Θk|xi,y i,Fi−1). The proposed speciﬁcation of
the MAACD model is very complex and demands very rich parametrization. In fact,
we allow for 220 diﬀerent parameters (i.e. 22 parameters for each of ten possible
states). But this generality does not come at a cost of a burdensome estimation
process. The real advantage of the model is that the estimation is very fast and easy
if we proﬁt from the decomposition of the likelihood function.
5 The Empirical Application
The intraday activity of the process of order submissions experiences very strong
intraday seasonality (see Figure 2). We assume the multiplicative diurnality pattern
and then, we model the deseasonalized variable ¯ xi =
xi
st using the MAACD speciﬁca-
tion. The intraday seasonality factor st is derived by the nonparametric method. We
apply kernel regression of durations on a time-of-day variable as has been proposed













where K is the quartic kernel function, h is the optimal bandwidth selected as
2.78sN− 1
5 (s is the standard deviation of the data), N is the number of observations
and ti is a time-of-day variable standardized on the [0,1] interval (i.e. a cumulative
number of seconds from 8.00 CET until the moment of the order submission and
then divided by the number of seconds in each day).
Using the deseasonalized series ¯ xi and the corresponding yi indicators, we estimated
the MAACD model with separate maximizing ten components of the log likelihood
function given by the formula 6. We used the BHHH optimization algorithm from
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the maxlik library of Gauss 10.0. The parameter estimates and their corresponding
p-values (corresponding to the standard errors computed with a robust “sandwich”
formula) are presented in Table 1. All variables that are responsible for dynamic
features of the MAACD model are statistically signiﬁcant, which conﬁrms strong
auto and crosscorrelations among time periods elapsing to diﬀerent orders. Each
of the main columns in the upper and lower panels of the table contain parameter
estimates that describe the conditional expectation of a duration that ends as one
of the ten possible outcomes. For example, in the ﬁrst column of the upper panel of
the table we show estimates of equation 4 for the duration expectation that elapses
with the arrival of the MS order. Analogously, the second column of the lower panel
of the table presents estimates of the conditional expected duration that elapses if
an IQB order is posted in the system. Diﬀerent intercepts (i.e. ˆ ωl,k) correspond
to various reactions of the expected duration to the preceding event, whereas ˆ αl,k
and ˆ βk estimates are responsible for the scale of duration clustering. The clustering
eﬀect may also vary according to the previous state because we allow for diﬀerent
ˆ αl,k coeﬃcients for the past duration, conditional on the type of a preceding order.
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I. ASK SIDE OF THE MARKET (SELL ORDERS)
MS, k=1 IQS, k=2 AQS, k=3 BQS, k=4 CS, k=5
parameters estimate p - value estimate p - value estimate p - value estimate p - value estimate p - value
ω1,k MS -0.0437 0.0539 0.6665 0.0000 0.5988 0.0000 0.5437 0.0000 0.4920 0.0000
ω2,k IQS 0.6044 0.0000 1.2937 0.0000 0.4715 0.0000 0.4570 0.0000 0.4430 0.0000
ω3,k AQS 0.4858 0.0000 0.9437 0.0000 0.2432 0.0001 0.5662 0.0000 -0.1009 0.0176
ω4,k BQS 0.8061 0.0000 1.1856 0.0000 0.7460 0.0000 0.2791 0.0000 0.9958 0.0000
ω5,k CS 0.8260 0.0000 -0.0784 0.0000 0.5894 0.0000 0.5341 0.0000 0.9454 0.0000
ω6,k MB 0.5240 0.0000 0.1420 0.0000 0.4005 0.0000 0.1479 0.0000 1.0578 0.0000
ω7,k IQB 0.8512 0.0000 1.1050 0.0000 0.8605 0.0000 0.5094 0.0000 0.9527 0.0000
ω8,k AQB 0.6912 0.0000 1.2293 0.0000 0.7605 0.0000 0.4827 0.0000 1.0244 0.0000
ω9,k BQB 0.8512 0.0000 1.1436 0.0000 0.8629 0.0000 0.6585 0.0000 1.0939 0.0000
ω10,k CB 0.6912 0.0000 0.9714 0.0000 0.9284 0.0000 0.6396 0.0000 1.0208 0.0000
βk 0.8256 0.0000 0.6862 0.0000 0.8573 0.0000 0.8732 0.0000 0.7859 0.0000
α1,k MS 0.1120 0.0000 0.1199 0.0000 0.1090 0.0000 0.1004 0.0000 0.1007 0.0000
α2,k IQS 0.1002 0.0000 0.1732 0.0000 0.1119 0.0000 0.1474 0.0000 0.1621 0.0000
α3,k AQS 0.0917 0.0000 0.2173 0.0000 0.1424 0.0000 0.1764 0.0000 0.1292 0.0000
α4,k BQS 0.1609 0.0000 0.2239 0.0000 0.1854 0.0000 0.1475 0.0000 0.1509 0.0000
α5,k CS 0.1411 0.0000 0.1429 0.0000 0.1253 0.0000 0.0740 0.0000 0.2012 0.0000
α6,k MB 0.1266 0.0000 0.0779 0.0000 0.0860 0.0000 0.0374 0.0006 0.1010 0.0000
α7,k IQB 0.1394 0.0000 0.2285 0.0000 0.1382 0.0000 0.1091 0.0000 0.1421 0.0000
α8,k AQB 0.1570 0.0000 0.2428 0.0000 0.1235 0.0001 0.0893 0.0000 0.1614 0.0000
α9,k BQB 0.1394 0.0000 0.2285 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.1237 0.0000 0.1974 0.0000
α10,kCB 0.1570 0.0000 0.2585 0.0000 0.1883 0.0000 0.1559 0.0000 0.1044 0.0000
γk 0.7533 0.0000 0.7959 0.0000 0.7897 0.0000 0.7878 0.0000 0.7954 0.0000
II. BID SIDE OF THE MARKET (BUY ORDERS)
MB, k=6 IQB, k=7 AQB, k=8 BQB, k=9 CB, k=10
parameters estimate p - value estimate p - value estimate p - value estimate p - value estimate p - value
ω1,k MS 1.0270 0.0000 0.1547 0.0000 0.5206 0.0000 0.0657 0.0145 1.1219 0.0000
ω2,k IQS 0.4451 0.0000 1.2617 0.0000 1.0773 0.0000 0.3939 0.0000 1.0776 0.0000
ω3,k AQS 0.8078 0.0000 1.3036 0.0000 0.9076 0.0000 0.3966 0.0000 1.1653 0.0000
ω4,k BQS 0.7997 0.0000 1.3170 0.0000 1.1397 0.0000 0.5467 0.0000 1.2018 0.0000
ω5,k CS 1.3696 0.0000 1.0206 0.0000 1.1696 0.0000 0.6053 0.0000 1.1347 0.0000
ω6,k MB -0.0040 0.8710 0.7478 0.0000 0.8637 0.0000 0.5319 0.0000 0.6670 0.0000
ω7,k IQB 0.6199 0.0000 1.4317 0.0000 0.6794 0.0000 0.3993 0.0000 0.5209 0.0000
ω8,k AQB 0.5822 0.0000 1.1176 0.0000 0.5541 0.0000 0.4958 0.0000 0.0350 0.4910
ω9,k BQB 0.9516 0.0000 1.3174 0.0000 1.0480 0.0000 0.2266 0.0000 1.2221 0.0000
ω10,kCB 1.0118 0.0000 -0.1800 0.0000 0.8500 0.0000 0.4308 0.0000 1.1967 0.0000
βk 0.8024 0.0000 0.6544 0.0000 0.8048 0.0000 0.8919 0.0000 0.7519 0.0000
α1,k MS 0.2099 0.0000 0.0591 0.0000 0.0424 0.0072 0.0282 0.0033 0.1037 0.0000
α2,k IQS 0.1393 0.0000 0.2168 0.0000 0.1669 0.0000 0.0917 0.0000 0.1782 0.0000
α3,k AQS 0.1661 0.0000 0.2385 0.0000 0.1425 0.0000 0.0937 0.0000 0.2091 0.0000
α4,k BQS 0.2034 0.0000 0.2358 0.0000 0.1759 0.0000 0.0961 0.0000 0.1985 0.0000
α5,k CS 0.1812 0.0000 0.2173 0.0000 0.1699 0.0000 0.1408 0.0000 0.1519 0.0000
α6,k MB 0.1141 0.0000 0.1336 0.0000 0.1157 0.0000 0.1092 0.0000 0.0916 0.0000
α7,k IQB 0.0696 0.0000 0.1473 0.0000 0.1474 0.0000 0.0948 0.0000 0.2148 0.0000
α8,k AQB 0.1279 0.0000 0.2240 0.0000 0.1701 0.0000 0.1658 0.0000 0.1270 0.0000
α9,k BQB 0.2077 0.0000 0.2587 0.0000 0.2022 0.0000 0.1230 0.0000 0.1735 0.0000
α10,kCB 0.1913 0.0000 0.1765 0.0000 0.1960 0.0000 0.0471 0.0025 0.2448 0.0000
γk 0.7428 0.0000 0.7787 0.0000 0.7833 0.0000 0.7940 0.0000 0.7861 0.0000
Table 1: Estimation results for the MAACD model.
The obtained results allow for the following interpretation:
• High autoregressive coeﬃcients (ˆ βk) prove the quite strong persistence of the
duration process, which is especially pronounced for submissions of the least
aggressive limit orders. The highest coeﬃcients correspond to the BQS and
BQB orders. We could risk saying at this point that these orders are not as
much information-motivated as the market and inside-the-quotes orders and
that the decision to submit them is not so vulnerable to the ﬂow of short-lived
information that may quickly lose its value. Accordingly, the clustering of
behind-the-quote orders is most persistent, which means that the forecasted
duration has a longer memory with respect to the past history of order submis-
sions. On the other hand, the smallest ˆ β coeﬃcients can be observed for orders
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that are placed inside of the best quotes, which means that they do not rely
as much on the information from the distant past, especially in comparison to
behind-the-quote orders.
• The coeﬃcients ˆ ωl,k represent “regime-switching” intercepts that change with
the type of the preceding order. A closer look at the various values of these
estimates for the MS and MB durations (the ﬁrst column in Table 1) allows
for the following conclusion: the coeﬃcient ˆ ω1,1 = −0.0437, corresponding to
the previous MS order, is the smallest among all other ˆ ωl,1 estimates and thus
means that the expected duration to a market sell will be most considerably
shortened in result of a market sell. Analogously, the same observation emerges
for the bid side of the market. From the contents within ﬁrst column of the
lower panel of the Table 1 we see that the obtained coeﬃcient ˆ ω6,6 = −0.0040
is the smallest among all other intercepts ˆ ωl,6, for l =1 ,2,...,10. Therefore,
realization of a market/marketable buy order exerts the strongest inﬂuence on
decreasing the time until another market/marketable buy order occurs. This
observation agrees with Biais (1995) showing that market orders cluster to-
gether as traders split large orders into small parts in an eﬀort to limit the
undesired price impact of a huge transaction. Interestingly, for the expected
duration at the end of which an IQS order is observed (second column of the
table 1), ˆ ω5,2 = −0.0784 is the smallest intercept. This coeﬃcient refers to
a previous cancellation of an order at the best ask (best sell order). Quite
naturally then, such an action results in a new submission of a best limit sell
order. The coeﬃcient ˆ ω6,2 =0 .1420 is the second smallest among ˆ ωl,2, which
means that transactions at the ask (buys) also accelerate the submissions of
best limit sell orders that establish the new most competitive ask price. This
results from a price-reverting behavior, a kind of a micro cycle build from
phases of liquidity consumption and replenishment as predicted by Parlour
(1998) (see Hypothesis H1). Execution of a MB order exhausts liquidity on
the ask side of a market and dealers can compete for an ask price that is at least
one tick (pip) better than the current one. Analogously, a symmetrical pattern
can be observed for the arrival rates of the IQB orders (the second column in
lower panel of Table 1). The expected duration to posting an inside-the-quote
buy shrinks most considerably after a cancellation on the same market side be-
cause ˆ ω10,7 = −0.1800 is the smallest intercept among all other ˆ ωl,7 estimates.
The second smallest coeﬃcient is ˆ ω1,7 =0 .1547; this corresponds to a previous
market sell.
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As a general rule the expected waiting times to market/marketable and inside-
the-quotes order submissions intercepts ˆ ω4,1,ˆ ω4,2 and ˆ ω9,6,ˆ ω9,7 are quite large
in value. This can mean that these most aggressive and price-improving or-
ders are (at least to some extent) information-motivated and do not have the
tendency to follow any behind-the-quote orders that are hidden in the depth
of the order book. The MS and MB durations will also rise in value if a can-
cellation occurs. Thus, if the bid-ask spread widens after a cancellation on any
side of a market, the transaction costs of the MB or MS orders will be higher.
In this case it will be more proﬁtable to place an inside-the-quote limit buy or
sell order than a market order.
The expected AQS duration shrinks most considerably in the presence of the
AQS order (ˆ ω3,3 =0 .2432 is the smallest coeﬃcient among ˆ ωl,3). For the bid
side of the market ˆ ω1,8 =0 .5206 is the smallest in value and thus the ex-
pected AQB duration shrinks most considerably in the presence of the MS
order. Watching the dynamics of the market sell may enhance FX dealers to
submit more orders at the best bid as the probability of their execution rises.
The arrival rate of behind-the-quote orders is strongly linked to the arrival of
market orders posted on the opposite side of the market. In terms of BQS
orders, the smallest intercept, ˆ ω6,4 =0 .1479, corresponds to the previous MB
order. Symmetrically, for the BQB orders, ˆ ω1,9 =0 .0657 is the smallest in
value thus pointing to the former MS order. This conﬁrms that limit orders
are perceived by market participants as a kind of a bet on the level of the FX
rate. Once there is a chance that the price will move upward as a result of a
large buy trade (induced by a MB order), BQS orders become more proﬁtable
and so they increase signiﬁcantly. At the same time if there is an opportunity
for the price to move downward as a result of a market sell (induced by a MS
order), traders bet on the scale of this movement and place the BQB orders
more frequently. It is also possible that if traders anticipate a rise (a drop) in
the FX rate they will post a MB (a MS) order and later a BQS (a BQB) order
just to close their currency position and to realize their gains more quickly.
A series of unexpected results were obtained for the best order cancellations.
Interestingly, the expected time to sell (buy) best limit order cancellations
shrinks most considerably after an AQS (AQB) order (ˆ ω3,5 = −0.1009 is the
smallest among ˆ ωl,5 and ˆ ω8,10 =0 .0350 is the smallest among ˆ ωl,10 coeﬃcients).
This means that many orders, once entered into an order book at the prevailing
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best quotes, are quickly withdrawn from the market before any other dealer can
react. One explanation for this may be a type of “spooﬁng” practice. Traders
insert very short-lived “ﬂeeting” orders and have no intention of executing a
trade at the submitted price. Such actions are supposed to move the exchange
rate down or up. Once an order appears and then subsequently disappears the
illusion of excess demand or excess supply at the best quotes can inﬂuence the
actions of other traders and move the rate in a desirable direction.
• The αl,k coeﬃcients inform how the duration observed between two events that
directly precede the current one urge or delay future trader actions. These co-
eﬃcients are responsible for a strong clustering of order durations. However,
it should be mentioned, that the comparison of this impact among durations
attributed to diﬀerent classes cannot be performed with the obtained coeﬃ-
cients values. Such a reasoning stems from the fact that the unconditional
(with respect to Fi−1) expected durations that end up in particular states are
also diﬀerent in value. Some classes of durations (i.e the MB durations or the
BQS durations) can be on average much shorter or much longer than the oth-
ers. This means that we should not compare the coeﬃcients αl,k for a selected
duration ending with a state yk. For example, if we look at αl,1 estimates for
the expected MS duration we see that they diﬀer in value (for l =1 ,2,...,10).
However, each of these coeﬃcients relates to the realization of a diﬀerent du-
ration xi−1,l if the state yl was observed at the time t − 1 (see Equation 4).
Because each of the durations xi−1,l (for l =1 ,2,...,10) has a diﬀerent distri-
bution that is characterized by its distinct conditional expectation Ψi−1,l and
shape parameter δl, the corresponding coeﬃcient values αl,1 cannot be directly
compared. We should not compare the coeﬃcients values across the current
state k (the coeﬃcients in the same column of Table 1), although we could do
this for the state l (the coeﬃcients in the same row of Table 1).
Looking at the parameter estimates presented in Tables (1), it is not possible
to establish ad hoc the most probable sequence that describes when orders of a
given type would most probably enter into the trading system. The diﬃculty
arises from the considerable size of the model, a huge number of estimated
coeﬃcients and the construction of the model for the the outcome variable
xi = min(xi,1,x i,2,...,xi,10). The expected time until a particular state de-
pends not only on the type of preceding order but also on the length of time
prior to this order. Analytical formulas for the conditional (with respect to
Fi−1 and not the current duration xi) transition probabilities do not have a
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closed analytic form. Moreover, the comparison of conditional expectations
of durations that end up in selected states are not enough to make predic-
tions about the future precedence of events. In our competing risk framework,
ten competing durations xi,k that construct the process of a realized duration
xi = min{x1,i,...,x10,i} are characterized by diﬀerent Weibull distributions.
These distributions have not only diﬀerent conditional expectations Ψk,i but
also diﬀerent shape parameters γk. The shape parameter has an impact on
the concentration of the probability mass near zero. Therefore, the answer to
the question of which duration, xi,k, wins the competition at time point ti by
being the shortest depends on both factors: the conditional expected values
of their distributions (hence Ψi,k) and the diﬀerent skewness of these distribu-
tions (hence γk).
In order to obtain the most probable chronological order according to which selected
events occur, we can use an easy way of simulating data from the MAACD model.
The simulation algorithm can be outlined as following:
1. For i = 1, set initial values for ˆ Ψi,k as mean estimates of (observable) series
xi,k (for k =1 ,2,...,10).
2. For k =1 ,2,...,10, draw n values of εj,k (j =1 ,2,...,n) from independent
Weibull distributions. Each distribution is characterized by the corresponding
shape parameter ˆ γk.
3. Compute xi,k = ˆ Φi,kεi,k, where ˆ Φi,k = ˆ Ψi,k · µ−1
εk = ˆ Ψi,k(Γ(1 + ˆ γk
−1))−1.
4. Set yi = l and xi = xi,l if a duration xi,l is the shortest (for l =1 ,2,...,10), i.e.
xi,l = min{xi,1,...,xi,l,...,xi,10}.
5. Compute ˆ Ψi+1,k with obtained yi and xi.
6. Iterate from (3) where i=i+1.
With the application of the algorithm we can obtain one simulated series of ar-
tiﬁcial data generated from the MAACD model. With this simulated time se-




i=1 ˆ xi,k. These values could be treated as proper initial values for ˆ Ψ1,k
in the ﬁrst step of the second run of the simulation.
We performed three runs of the simulations each time having sampled 1,000,000 real-
izations of the pair (xi,y i). The accuracy of the last run of the performed simulation
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has been checked, because we reestimated the MAACD model with the simulated
data series and obtained estimates that were very similar to initial parameter values
(with an accuracy equal to a second or third digit right of the decimal point).
The simulation output can be of importance if one wants to compute the frequencies
that proxy the unconditional transition probabilities between the ten selected classes
of orders. The simulation results are presented in Table (2). In the ﬁrst column of
the table we indicate the class of an order submitted or cancelled at time ti−1 (i.e.
the type of the preceding order). The further ten columns correspond to obtained
frequencies of events that took place at ti. For example, in the ﬁrst row of Table (2),
we show the estimate of the transition probability that after a MS order another MS
order (column 2), IQS order (column 3), AQS order (column 4), BQS order (column
5), CS order (column 6), MB order (column 7), IQB order (column 8), AQB order
(column 9), BQB order (column 10) or CB order (column 11) is observed. Thus,
the elements in each row of the table must sum to one. The obtained results can be
summarized as this:
• We conﬁrm the Hypotheses 1. After the occurrence of a MS order an IQB
order is the most likely (19.4 % cases). However, the following MS orders are
nearly as frequent as the IBQ (18.5 % cases). Symmetrically, after a MB order
an IQS order takes place 19.7 % of the time or another MB order 19.5 % of the
time. As predicted by Parlour (1998), market sell (market buy) orders absorb
liquidity from the market. As a result of that the bid-ask spread widens and
it becomes more costly to cross the market and initiate an immediate trade.
Thus, it is more proﬁtable for traders who want to buy (sell) to use limit
orders and to compete for the bid (ask) price that is at least one pip (tick)
better than the current quote. The obtained regularity agrees with results of
Lo & Sapp (2008), who document a kind of a book rebalancing scenario. Our
result expand upon their ﬁndings since we diﬀerentiate between the sides of
the market and prove that after a market sell (buy) the arrival of the best sell
(buy) limit order is the most probable. On the other hand, we also document
the follow-on strategy outlined by Biais (1995) which shows that market buy
(sell) orders arrive in clusters. The events with the smallest probability are
the AQB and AQS orders (about 4-5 % of cases); this is simply due to the
small number of these orders in our data. We also conﬁrm the Hypothesis 2
as the probability of observing a MS after a MB order or vice versa is very
small (about 8 % of cases). This conﬁrms the “crowding out” eﬀect outlined
by Parlour (1998).
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by Parlour (1998).
22 • After the arrival of an IQS order the most frequent event is a MB order (about
14 % of cases). Symmetrically, after an IQB order a MS order is expected to
arrive. Submission of the inside-the-quote order decreases the bid-ask spread
and creates a kind of enhancement for the opposite side of the market to
execute a proﬁtable transaction. We also see that orders placed inside-the-
quotes tend to follow each other. This proves the “diagonal eﬀect” that is
demonstrated also in Goettler et al. (2005). Yeo (2002) predicts that if a new
limit order changes the best price then the former best order will be cancelled
and resubmitted at the new and better price. Hasbrouck & Saar (2009) report
that this kind of “price-chasing”scenario is a possible explanation for existence
of ﬂeeting orders.
• As expected, AQS and AQB orders are most probably followed by CS and CB
events (about 16 % of cases). This can be explained by the possible spooﬁng
practice. AQS and AQB orders tend also to be followed by IQS and the IQB
orders (about 13 % of cases), respectively. This ﬁnding relates closely to the
depth of the order book and supports the Hypothesis 4. The submission of an
at-the-quote order lengthens the queue of orders that wait for realization at
the best prices available. These dealers who want to buy or to sell would rather
“jump-the-queue” and submit an inside-the-quote order to get the priority of
execution (about 13 % of cases) or even submit a market order (about 11 %
of cases).
• BQS and BQB orders are unobservable thus traders cannot react to them di-
rectly. Nevertheless, their arrival rates reﬂect certain market conditions which
can inﬂuence trader behavior indirectly. The most striking observation is their
clustering eﬀect. The placement of the BQS (BQB) order induces more BQS
(BQB) orders, which means that the process of liquidity supply is characterized
by clustering.
• Cancellations of best orders tends to be followed by submission of the best
inside-the-quote orders on the same market side. This observation is striking
since about 28 % of events that succeed CS order are IQS orders and about 31
% of the events that follow CB orders are IQB orders. After a cancellation of
the best order there will be a free space (of at least one unit) for another best
order placed on the same market side.
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MS IQS AQS BQS CS MB IQB AQB BQB CB
MS 0.185 (2) 0.131 (3) 0.043 (10) 0.077 (6) 0.081 (5) 0.075 (7) 0.194 (1) 0.046 (9) 0.114 (4) 0.049 (8)
IQS 0.110 (5) 0.122 (3) 0.065 (9) 0.112 (4) 0.105 (6) 0.142 (1) 0.126 (2) 0.040 (10) 0.103 (7) 0.070 (8)
AQS 0.111 (3) 0.133 (2) 0.079 (8) 0.107 (5) 0.156 (1) 0.111 (4) 0.106 (6) 0.038 (10) 0.094 (7) 0.061 (9)
BQS 0.103 (5) 0.130 (3) 0.063 (9) 0.158 (1) 0.072 (8) 0.139 (2) 0.122 (4) 0.041 (10) 0.098 (6) 0.072 (7)
CS 0.104 (3) 0.281 (1) 0.061 (8) 0.093 (4) 0.081 (6) 0.067 (7) 0.131 (2) 0.035 (10) 0.087 (5) 0.059 (9)
MB 0.080 (5) 0.197 (1) 0.055 (8) 0.114 (4) 0.048 (9) 0.195 (2) 0.127 (3) 0.037 (10) 0.074 (6) 0.073 (7)
IQB 0.137 (1) 0.136 (2) 0.046 (10) 0.100 (7) 0.071 (8) 0.114 (4) 0.120 (3) 0.058 (9) 0.106 (6) 0.113 (5)
AQB 0.103 (6) 0.113 (4) 0.050 (10) 0.094 (7) 0.061 (9) 0.118 (3) 0.133 (2) 0.065 (8) 0.105 (5) 0.157 (1)
BQB 0.134 (2) 0.131 (3) 0.054 (9) 0.099 (6) 0.072 (7) 0.109 (5) 0.130 (4) 0.048 (10) 0.158 (1) 0.065 (8)
CB 0.062 (7) 0.134 (2) 0.042 (10) 0.089 (4) 0.053 (8) 0.095 (3) 0.312 (1) 0.051 (9) 0.089 (5) 0.074 (6)
Table 2: Transition probabilities – simulation results. Column (1) contains a type of a directly
preceding event. Numbers in brackets sort the transition probabilities in a descending order.
6 Impact of the Explanatory Variables
In order to examine potential microstructure factors that may have an impact on or-
der choice and the pace of order submissions/cancellations, we enriched the MAACD
model with the following explanatory variables:
• Bid-ask spread (spr), deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the best ask price
and the best bid price in the system before the moment of order submis-
sion/cancellation.
• Ask depth (adep) and bid depth (bdep), deﬁned as the cumulated sizes of
limit orders oﬀered to sell (buy) at the best ask and at the best bid price,
respectively.
• Ask depth and bid depth dummies (adepd, bdepd). The indicators are equal
to one if the ask depth or the bid depth is larger than 10 M. EUR and if the
actual amount of depth is hidden.
• Ask and bid quote slopes (askQS, bidQS). Ask quote slope is deﬁned as the
ratio of the diﬀerence between the worst (the highest) ask price prevailing in
the system (P worst
ask ) and the best ask price (P best










Bid quote slope is deﬁned as the ratio of the diﬀerence between the best bid
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to one if the ask depth or the bid depth is larger than 10 M. EUR and if the
actual amount of depth is hidden.
• Ask and bid quote slopes (askQS, bidQS). Ask quote slope is deﬁned as the
ratio of the diﬀerence between the worst (the highest) ask price prevailing in
the system (P worst
ask ) and the best ask price (P best
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• EUR/PLN rate volatility (vol), constructed as a realized volatility estimate
for the past 10 minutes prior to the moment of order submission. In order to
calculate realized volatility estimate, log returns of all observable mid prices
have been used.
• EUR/PLN return (ret), as the log return of the EUR/PLN mid price during
past 10 minutes prior to the moment of a given event.
• EUR/USD return (EURUSDret), as the log return of the EUR/USD mid price
during past 10 minutes prior to the moment of a given event.
• Two time-of-day dummies that describe possible ﬂuctuations in the dispro-
portion of selected order types: (1) the morning eﬀect (begin) (d1 dummy is
equal to 1 if an order is submitted between 8:00 and 8:30 and is equal to zero
otherwise), (2) the afternoon eﬀect (end) (d2 dummy is equal to 1 if an order
is placed between 17:30 and 18:00 and is equal to zero otherwise).
These explanatory variables that were characterized by a cyclical behaviors (the bid-
ask spread, the ask and bid quote slopes, the realized volatility estimate) have been
initially deseasonalized. Diurnality factors were estimated with a formula (7). After
such a transformation the series depicts a kind of “innovation” that is independent
from the repetitive day-by-day seasonal pattern.
Figure 3: Diurnality pattern for the bid-ask spread, the realized volatility, the bid quote slope
and the ask quote slope.
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The estimation results are presented in Table 4. Interestingly, after the inclusion of
the explanatory variables in the MAACD speciﬁcation the parameters responsible
for the persistence of MB and MS order submissions changed. Parameter estimates
for the market order durations, ˆ β1 =0 .3976 and ˆ β6 =0 .4475, are much smaller
than in the initial speciﬁcation without explanatory variables. This means that the
additional factors took over much of the duration variation. It further conﬁrms our
hypothesis that in the event of the most aggressive orders, very prompt information
ﬂows reﬂected by changes in market microstructure features (i.e. the bid-ask spread,
depth, volatility, past returns) are the major driving force behind the pace of their
submissions. As the persistence of the process decreased the impact of the informa-
tion from the distant past has a smaller value. In the next chapter we will present
the impact of the individual factors.
6.1 Bid-Ask Spread
As suggested by the theoretical literature (Foucault (1999)), we document the sig-
niﬁcant negative impact11 (at a 1 % signiﬁcance level) of the bid-ask spread on the
expected time to a MB or a MS order. Thus, the increase in the bid-ask spread
deﬂates the probability of market/marketable order submissions. Simultaneously, it
signiﬁcantly increases the probability that an IQB or IQS order is placed in the sys-
tem. This ﬁnding is consistent with the results of a number of empirical studies (i.e.
Biais (1995); Harris (1998); Bae et al. (2003); Ranaldo (2004); Ellul et al. (2007)).
Hitting or taking the quotes is much more expensive if the bid-ask spread is large
and traders prefer to consume liquidity when it is cheap. On the other hand, it is
much more proﬁtable for market participants to provide liquidity in the form of IQB
or IQS limit orders. As the coeﬃcients ˆ δspr,2 and ˆ δspr,7 are signiﬁcant and negative,
the wide bid-ask spread encourages the submission of the most competitive limit
orders. If the bid-ask spread is wide it is easier to compete for the price that is at
least one tick (pip) better then the current one, as it would improve the likelihood
of an order execution at a very small expense. Hence, we conﬁrm the Hypothesis
4. The rise in the bid-ask spread also prompts the submission of at-the-quotes and
behind-the-quotes orders on both sides of the market. A possible explanation for
this is that when the bid-ask spread rises as a result of an adverse selection risk the
traders prefer to place orders that are far away from the midquote in order to avoid
11In the sample there are 92,818 observations. We rest on the assumption that the number of
observations is large enough to base our inference on the asymptotic normality of the maximum
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the risk of being “picked-oﬀ”. Although the coeﬃcients corresponding to the bid-
ask spread in the case of at-the-quote and behind-the-quote orders are negative and
signiﬁcant (at a 5 % signiﬁcance level), they are very small in value when compared
to market or inside-the-quote orders. Accordingly, the bid-ask spread has a much
greater impact on the arrival rate of the most aggressive orders. The impact of the
bid-ask spread is rather symmetric on the ask and bid market side although slight
disproportions can be observed. The expected duration to a MS order (i.e. sell EUR
and buy PLN) reacts more strongly to the increase of the bid-ask spread than the ex-
pected waiting time to a MB order (buy EUR and sell PLN). Maybe this is because
a fraction of the bid-ask spread could be information-motivated and an increase in
the adverse selection costs results in a diﬀerent valuation of the open currency po-
sitions in euros versus in the Polish zloty. Investments in zloty are treated as more
risky and so the probability of aggressive selling deﬂates in a more considerable way.
We also report that the increase in the bid-ask spread induces more cancellations
on the both market sides. The coeﬃcients ˆ δspr,5 and ˆ δspr,10 are signiﬁcant (at a 5 %
level) and negative but quite small when compared with the impact of the bid-ask
spread on the MS or MB durations. Therefore, we cannot support the hypothesis H6
that small bid-ask spread induces more cancellations while best limit orders tend to
be cancelled and replaced by market orders. On the contrary, if the bid-ask spread
widens, traders tend to cancel the best orders and replace them by more competitive
ones.
6.2 Depth
The second important microstructure variables are the ask and the bid depths. An
increase in the size of orders that are oﬀered at the best prices on both sides of
the market inﬂates the probability that a MS order will arrive as predicted by the
hypothesis H3. The negative coeﬃcients ˆ δadep,1 and ˆ δbdep,1 prove that a rise in these
observable liquidity measures shortens MS durations. A large depth at the best bid
encourages aggressive sells. Therefore, if a trader wants to execute a high-volume
sell order, suﬃcient depth at the best bid guarantees a prompt execution without
the risk of hitting an unfavorable price. This “enhancement eﬀect” is additionally
pronounced by the signiﬁcant (at a 1 % level) coeﬃcient ˆ δbdepd,1 = −0.4484, indi-
cating that a depth of more than 10 M. EUR is hidden at the best bid. Such a
signal could be interpreted as additional encouragement for submitting aggressive
sell orders. On the other hand, we obtained a negative and signiﬁcant (at a 1 %
level) coeﬃcient ˆ δadep,1 = −0.048 thus the increase in the size of best limit sell orders
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prevailing in the system induces more sell trades. The large depth at the best ask can
have an informative meaning for the context of a quasi-technical analysis performed
by market participants (see Osler (2003); Ellul et al. (2007)). An increase in the
ask depth may indicate a near future drop in the exchange rate. Ellul et al. (2007)
found a similar result for the NYSE stocks and called it the“short-term forecasting
hypothesis”.
Similar results as for MS durations can be found for MB durations. An increase in
the market depth, either at the best ask or at the best bid, exerts a signiﬁcant posi-
tive inﬂuence on the probability of submitting an aggressive market order. Although,
the corresponding depth dummies are insigniﬁcant. Thus, the results support the
hypothesis H3. It is interesting to note that in the case of MB durations the im-
pact of the ask depth is slightly larger than the impact of the bid depth as we have
|ˆ δadep,6| > |ˆ δbdep,6|. Analogously, for MS orders the following equation holds true
|ˆ δadep,1| < |ˆ δbdep,1|. The inequalities evidence that the “enhancement eﬀect” is more
pronounced than the eﬀect of the“short-term forecasting eﬀect”of Ellul et al. (2007).
As far as IQB and IQS orders are concerned, we ﬁnd perfect evidence for the“jump
the queue”hypothesis as stated in Ellul et al. (2007). The large depth at the best ask
prompts the submission of best limit sell orders that improve on the current price
(ˆ δadep,2 < 0). Accordingly, the large depth at the best bid encourages traders to post
a limit buy order with a price at least one tick better in order to gain execution
priority (ˆ δbdep,7 < 0 and ˆ δbdepd,7 < 0). On the other hand, an increase in the visible
depth on the bid (ask) side hinders the pace of the IQS (IQB) orders as forecasted
by the “short-term forecasting hypothesis”.
The impact of depth on AQS and AQB durations is signiﬁcantly negative so that
the large queue at the best quotes does not discourage traders to oﬀer/bid more
quantities at these prices. Such a result is diﬃcult to explain. The submission of
AQB and AQS orders rules out the priority of execution; nevertheless, at-the-quote
orders have a tendency to arrive in clusters. The reaction of BQS and BQB orders
to the changes in depth is much smaller in value but also lead to some interesting
conclusions. The BQS durations shrink as a result of an increase in the depth at
the best bid but lengthen with the depth at the best ask. Symmetric observation
refers to BQB orders. The BQB duration shrinks as a result of an increase in the
depth of the best ask. In agreement with the “short-term forecasting hypothesis”,
the increase in quantity oﬀered to sell at the best ask signals a short-term price
drop. Consequently, it increases the probability that a BQB order will be executed.
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Similarly, if there is a large order placed at the best bid, traders anticipate that
the EUR/PLN rate will rise and thus a BQS order will be executed with greater
probability. Conversely, large depth at the best ask deﬂates the probability of BQS
order execution.
6.3 Quote Slopes
Quote slopes are totally unobservable for market participants and thus they cannot
be taken into consideration when determining their order decisions. On the other
hand, ﬂuctuations in overall liquidity reﬂected in quote slopes may inﬂuence trader
behavior indirectly. Periodic liquidity shocks with respect to bid or ask sides of the
market induce certain trading choices. We observe that the quote slope of the ask
side of the order book has a signiﬁcant and positive impact on the expected IQS and
AQS durations. An increase in the slope indicates a deterioration of the liquidity
supply. If there is a liquidity squeeze on the ask side of an order book, the placement
of the IQS and AQS orders slows down. The state of the order book is also closely
bound to the value of the technical analysis. A lesser liquidity on the ask side signals
an upward price pressure and thus traders restrain from submitting aggressive limit
orders to avoid the risk of being picked oﬀ. Instead, traders submit more market
buy orders as can be observed from the signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient ˆ δaskQS,6.
The steeper slope on the bid side of the market is correlated with the accelerated
submission of MS, IQS and AQS orders. This can also be predicted from the“short-
term forecasting hypothesis” and can be explained by the fact that the state of the
order book can be partially anticipated by traders on the basis of orders left by
their non-bank clients. Interestingly, the deterioration of the liquidity supply on the
bid side of the market is linked with accelerated submission of MB and IQB orders,
hence an increase in the overall trading activity.
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ASK SIDE OF THE MARKET (SELL ORDERS)
MS, k=1 IQS, k=2 AQS, k=3 BQS, k=4 CS, k=5
parameters estimate p - value estimate p - value estimate p - value estimate p - value estimate p - value
ω1,k MS 0.5120 0.0000 0.9070 0.0000 0.6950 0.0000 0.5686 0.0000 0.5411 0.0000
ω2,k IQS 1.4404 0.0000 1.6483 0.0000 0.5352 0.0000 0.4882 0.0000 0.5061 0.0000
ω3,k AQS 1.5189 0.0000 1.2003 0.0000 0.3803 0.0000 0.6025 0.0000 -0.0612 0.3029
ω4,k BQS 1.9256 0.0000 1.4814 0.0000 0.8493 0.0000 0.3198 0.0000 1.0612 0.0000
ω5,k CS 1.0452 0.0000 0.2923 0.0000 0.6849 0.0000 0.5752 0.0000 1.0402 0.0000
ω6,k MB 1.8821 0.0000 0.3869 0.0000 0.5006 0.0000 0.1816 0.0000 1.1055 0.0000
ω7,k IQB 0.9158 0.0000 1.4603 0.0000 0.9434 0.0000 0.5402 0.0000 1.0317 0.0000
ω8,k AQB 1.9606 0.0000 1.5049 0.0000 0.8947 0.0000 0.5451 0.0000 1.0942 0.0000
ω9,k BQB 1.6969 0.0000 1.4421 0.0000 0.9573 0.0000 0.6806 0.0000 1.1762 0.0000
ω10,k CB 2.3439 0.0000 1.3623 0.0000 1.0425 0.0000 0.6832 0.0000 1.1176 0.0000
βk 0.3976 0.0000 0.6523 0.0000 0.8441 0.0000 0.8686 0.0000 0.7715 0.0000
α1,k MS 0.2193 0.0000 0.1191 0.0000 0.1132 0.0000 0.1026 0.0000 0.1057 0.0000
α2,k IQS 0.1739 0.0000 0.1770 0.0000 0.1240 0.0000 0.1537 0.0000 0.1701 0.0000
α3,k AQS 0.2065 0.0000 0.2083 0.0000 0.1486 0.0000 0.1772 0.0000 0.1366 0.0000
α4,k BQS 0.2279 0.0000 0.2387 0.0000 0.1874 0.0000 0.1457 0.0000 0.1620 0.0000
α5,k CS 0.3252 0.0000 0.1690 0.0000 0.1331 0.0000 0.0796 0.0000 0.2112 0.0000
α6,k MB 0.3377 0.0000 0.0697 0.0000 0.0884 0.0000 0.0364 0.0017 0.1042 0.0000
α7,k IQB 0.2558 0.0000 0.2329 0.0000 0.1441 0.0000 0.1123 0.0000 0.1512 0.0000
α8,k AQB 0.3006 0.0000 0.2602 0.0000 0.1344 0.0000 0.0971 0.0000 0.1707 0.0000
α9,k BQB 0.3887 0.0000 0.2438 0.0000 0.1738 0.0000 0.1253 0.0000 0.2045 0.0000
α10,kCB 0.3604 0.0000 0.2565 0.0000 0.1970 0.0000 0.1573 0.0000 0.1137 0.0000
γk 0.7360 0.0000 0.8012 0.0000 0.7941 0.0000 0.7902 0.0000 0.7963 0.0000
δspr,k 1.2086 0.0000 -0.2029 0.0000 -0.0219 0.0024 -0.0161 0.0018 -0.0317 0.0064
δadep,k -0.0480 0.0000 -0.0230 0.0000 -0.0088 0.0200 0.0047 0.0665 -0.0046 0.2758
δbdep,k -0.0329 0.0000 0.0104 0.0069 -0.0104 0.0005 -0.0088 0.0000 0.0036 0.3294
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δbidQS,k -0.1136 0.0000 -0.0132 0.0300 -0.0106 0.0191 0.0033 0.2596 -0.0013 0.7938
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δbegin,k 0.0044 0.9444 0.0541 0.1007 0.0471 0.0698 0.0609 0.0004 0.0369 0.1781
δend,k 0.1604 0.0086 -0.0679 0.0085 0.1835 0.0000 0.0666 0.0000 0.0121 0.6100
BID SIDE OF THE MARKET (BUY ORDERS)
MB, k=6 IQB, k=7 AQB, k=8 BQB, k=9 CB, k=10
parameters estimate p - value estimate p - value estimate p - value estimate p - value estimate p - value
ω1,k MS 1.8377 0.0000 0.4381 0.0000 0.6530 0.0000 0.1089 0.0026 1.2560 0.0000
ω2,k IQS 0.6959 0.0000 1.6300 0.0000 1.1895 0.0000 0.4382 0.0000 1.2476 0.0000
ω3,k AQS 1.6917 0.0000 1.5650 0.0000 1.0634 0.0000 0.4908 0.0000 1.3391 0.0000
ω4,k BQS 1.4718 0.0000 1.6438 0.0000 1.2553 0.0000 0.5919 0.0000 1.3905 0.0000
ω5,k CS 2.0186 0.0000 1.4878 0.0000 1.3046 0.0000 0.6718 0.0000 1.3524 0.0000
ω6,k MB 0.3217 0.0000 1.0124 0.0000 0.9868 0.0000 0.5735 0.0000 0.8154 0.0000
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ω8,k AQB 1.3654 0.0000 1.4361 0.0000 0.7222 0.0000 0.5415 0.0000 0.1565 0.1066
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βk 0.4475 0.0000 0.6181 0.0000 0.7909 0.0000 0.8824 0.0000 0.7170 0.0000
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α7,k IQB 0.1250 0.0000 0.1493 0.0000 0.1537 0.0000 0.1024 0.0000 0.2324 0.0000
α8,k AQB 0.2076 0.0000 0.2365 0.0000 0.1831 0.0000 0.1726 0.0000 0.1406 0.0000
α9,k BQB 0.3402 0.0000 0.2716 0.0000 0.2079 0.0000 0.1271 0.0000 0.1916 0.0000
α10,kCB 0.3335 0.0000 0.1803 0.0000 0.2014 0.0000 0.0554 0.0008 0.2590 0.0000
γk 0.7324 0.0000 0.7839 0.0000 0.7855 0.0000 0.7970 0.0000 0.7875 0.0000
δspr,k 1.1108 0.0000 -0.2401 0.0000 -0.0112 0.3121 -0.0143 0.0022 -0.0450 0.0195
δadep,k -0.0489 0.0000 0.0105 0.0293 -0.0137 0.0060 -0.0109 0.0000 -0.0034 0.5070
δbdep,k -0.0349 0.0000 -0.0229 0.0000 -0.0112 0.0146 0.0024 0.2276 -0.0080 0.0754
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δbdepd,k 0.0029 0.9852 -0.2029 0.0141 0.0290 0.7940 0.0254 0.6555 -0.0228 0.8348
δaskQS,k -0.0249 0.0377 0.0175 0.0423 -0.0096 0.1614 0.0116 0.0003 -0.0109 0.1011
δbidQS,k -0.0419 0.0003 -0.0203 0.0021 -0.0038 0.5423 -0.0094 0.0009 0.0140 0.0469
δvol,k -0.1693 0.0000 0.0276 0.0191 -0.0007 0.9516 0.0058 0.2113 0.0194 0.1183
δret,k -0.0139 0.0000 0.0022 0.0014 0.0022 0.0028 0.0009 0.0041 -0.0026 0.0007
δEURUSDret,k 0.0072 0.0000 -0.0004 0.6406 0.0007 0.3593 -0.0005 0.1159 -0.0004 0.6584
δbegin,k 0.2118 0.0009 -0.0492 0.1118 0.0337 0.2909 0.0294 0.0270 0.0947 0.0069
δend,k 0.0550 0.2649 -0.0408 0.1660 0.1854 0.0001 0.0638 0.0000 0.0006 0.9819
Table 3:Estimation results for the MAACD model with explanatory variables.
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6.4 Volatility
We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of the return volatility on the submissions of market
orders (for both sides of the market) and inside-the-quotes limit orders (only for
the bid side of the market). The impact is negative for MS and MB durations and
positive for the IQB durations, contrary to predictions of Foucault (1999). Our
results also do not conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Lo & Sapp (2008) who report an overall
trading decline in the presence of increased volatility. Thus, we do not ﬁnd a support
for the Hypothesis 5. The FX rate volatility is a traditional measure of market
uncertainty. An increase in volatility increases the risk of being picked oﬀ and so the
frequency of submitting best limit orders decreases. Handa & Schwartz (1996) report
on the rationale of placing limit orders for informed or liquidity traders; they ﬁnd that
if volatility increases due to informed trading, the risk of being bagged by informed
traders rises. This ﬁnding generally agrees with results of Fong & Liu (2010) who
report that if traders observe a large price swing they will withdraw or relocate their
orders away from the market price. On the other hand, in volatile periods traders
close their currency positions that may be associated with the more intense use of
market orders. Interestingly enough, we obtained the relation ˆ δvol,1 < ˆ δvol,6, which
means that traders accelerate buy transactions more considerably if they want to
buy zloty (sell euro) than if they want to sell zloty (buy euro). As far as orders
cancellations are concerned, volatility does not seem to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence their
arrival rate and thus we cannot support Hypothesis 7.
6.5 Momentum
Our results clearly conﬁrm that the direction of the FX rate in the past 10 minutes
has a signiﬁcant impact on the order choice. Upward movement of the EUR/PLN
rate, hence a Polish zloty depreciation, hinders placement of MS orders (market
orders to sell euro and buy zloty) and enhances MB orders (market orders to buy
euro and sell zloty). This means that traders act according to a momentum, or a
trend-following strategy. The acceleration of MB order submissions is particularly
pronounced since the ˆ δret,6 is quite large in value. The selling pressure of the zloty
makes IQB, AQB and BQB orders unproﬁtable since once the trend continues their
probability of execution declines (ˆ δret,7 > 0, ˆ δret,8 > 0, ˆ δret,9 > 0). Similarly, those
traders who want to sell would rather use AQS or even BQB orders as there is a
chance that they will be matched when the FX rate reaches a certain level. A zloty
depreciation hinders cancellation of best limit sell orders whereas it prompts cancel-
lation of best limit buys as predicted by a trend-chasing practice.
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We also observe a signiﬁcant impact concerning EUR/USD changes on the submis-
sion rate of MB orders. If during the past 10 minutes the EUR/USD rate moves
in the upward direction (dollar depreciates towards euro), the submission of market
orders to buy euro and sell zloty will be deterred. In the period under study, the
dollar depreciation was closely linked to a decrease in the global risk aversion and
an increased interest in currencies of emerging markets. Therefore, traders refrained
from selling Polish zloty.
6.6 Time of day
The begin-of-day dummy is signiﬁcantly positive and large in value for market orders
to buy euro and sell Polish zloty. The coeﬃcient is also positive for BQS and BQB
(at the 5 % signiﬁcance level) durations. This means that once trading begins,
the provision of liquidity is deteriorated in comparison to the rest of the day. The
submission of behind-the-quotes orders becomes unproﬁtable because of their small
execution probability due to a slow trading intensity. The impact of the afternoon
eﬀect is quite similar; submissions of AQS, BQS, AQB and BQB orders are also
less frequent. Additionally, traders refrain from aggressive buying of euro (selling
zloty) in the morning and from aggressive selling of euro (buying zloty) at the end
of the day. We were not able to conﬁrm the conviction that market orders dominate
trading in the beginning of a day whereas limit orders cluster at the end of a day
(see Bloomfeld et al. (2005)).
6.7 Symmetry Restrictions
As the last step of our empirical analysis we tested some symmetry restrictions with
respect to the impact of selected explanatory variables on order dynamics on an
ask and bid side of a market. With a help of the likelihood ratio test we veriﬁed
several null hypotheses about the equal impact of: 1.) the bid-ask spread, 2.) mar-
ket depth, 3.) volatility and 4.) the bid/ask quote slopes on the pace of order
submissions when traders intend to buy zloty (sell euro) versus when they intend
to sell zloty (buy euro). Interestingly, in case of nearly all order submissions, the
null of equal impact of selected microstructure factors should be rejected (at a 95
% conﬁdence level). Only in case of order cancellations, the impact of all selected
explanatory variables can be treated as equal for both market sides.
Especially for market orders, the signiﬁcant disproportions in coeﬃcient values for
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the bid-ask spread, depth dummies, volatility and the quote slopes can be observed.
The parameter estimates for the ask side of a market are much larger in value, which
means that the immediate decisions to buy zloty (sell euro) are signiﬁcantly more
sensitive to liquidity or information motivated factors. From this viewpoint, our
general and richly parameterized duration model can be fully justiﬁed.
H0 : δspr,1 = δspr,6 δspr,2 = δspr,7 δspr,3 = δspr,8 δspr,4 = δspr,9 δspr,5 = δspr,10
p − val : 0.0031 0.0001 0.0108 0.0133 0.1730
H0 : δadep,1 = δbdep,6 δadep,2 = δbdep,7 δadep,3 = δbdep,8 δadep,4 = δbdep,9 δadep,5 = δbdep,10
δadepd,1 = δbdepd,6 δadepd,2 = δbdepd,7 δadepd,3 = δbdep,8 δadepd,4 = δbdepd,9 δadepd,5 = δbdepd,10
δbdep,1 = δadep,6 δbdep,2 = δadep,7 δbdep,3 = δadep,8 δbdep,4 = δadep,9 δbdep,5 = δadep,10
δbdepd,1 = δadepd,6 δbdepd,2 = δadepd,7 δbdepd,3 = δadep,8 δbdepd,4 = δadepd,9 δbdepd,5 = δadepd,10
p − val : 0.0012 0.1150 0.0794 0.0920 0.2337
H0 : δvol,1 = δvol,6 δvol,2 = δvol,7 δvol,3 = δvol,8 δvol,4 = δvol,9 δvol,5 = δvol,10
p − val : 0.0000 0.0064 0.0108 0.0133 0.999
H0 : δaskQS,1 = δbidQS,6 δaskQS,2 = δbidQS,7 δaskQS,3 = δbidQS,8 δaskQS,4 = δbidQS,9 δaskQS,5 = δbidQS,10
δbidQS,1 = δaskQS,6 δbidQS,2 = δaskQS,7 δbidQS,3 = δaskQS,8 δbidQS,4 = δaskQS,9 δbidQS,5 = δaskQS,10
p − val : 0.0000 0.0060 0.0370 0.0028 0.1562
Table 4: Symmetry restrictions – results from the likelihood ratio test.
7 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature on order dynamics in two main aspects. We
generalize the asymmetric ACD model of Bauwens & Giot (2003) to the case when
there are more than two competing risks. The obtained multistate ACD model can
serve as a ﬂexible tool for description of expected durations, at the end of which
particular events (i.e. states deﬁned on a “micro scale” by appropriate thinning the
data) can take place. In our model the selected events correspond to submissions or
cancellations of orders attributed to particular order classes. The model describes
the bivariate density for durations (time intervals between selected orders) and the
corresponding event classes (discrete variables indicating the type of an event). Thus,
it can account for the very complex dynamics inherent to the order-driven market.
As the time variable plays ﬁrst ﬁddle, the model describes the pace of dealer activi-
ties when confronted with actions taken by other market participants. We also show
how to simulate data from the multistate ACD speciﬁcation thus enabling a more
detailed insight into the data generating process. In the empirical analysis we use
data for the EUR/PLN currency pair from a very popular interbank trading venue:
the Reuters Dealing 3000 Spot Matching System. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst
study that investigates trader preference with regard to order choices within the
emerging currency markets.
We establish the most probable sequence according to which orders classiﬁed to se-
lected classes arrive to the market or are withdrawn from it. We identify market
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microstructure factors that exert an inﬂuence on the expected time until a given
event takes place. Our results verify selected hypotheses on determinants of order
choice and their timing in limit order markets. As the results we obtained are quite
extensive, we will restrict ourselves to those that refer to the hypotheses stated in
the section 2. The hypotheses (1-4) have been supported. The limit sells (buys) are
more probable after market buys (sells) than after market sells (buys). Market orders
submitted on the same side cluster together thus the sequence buy-buy (sell-sell) is
more probable than buy-sell or sell-buy. Large depth visible on one side of the mar-
ket enhances more inside-the-quote orders placed on the same side of the order book
as is predicted by Hall & Hautsch (2006) and Anand et al. (2005). The same also ac-
counts for aggressive market orders on both market sides, which can be explained by
the “enhancement eﬀect” or the “short-term forecasting eﬀect”. The bid-ask spread
decreases the pace of market order submissions and increases the arrival rate of limit
orders (see Biais (1995); Harris (1998); Bae et al. (2003); Ranaldo (2004); Ellul et al.
(2007) and Lo & Sapp (2008)). The increase in market uncertainty, proxied by the
realized volatility, prompts market orders (especially theses to buy euro and to sell
zloty) and decreases the number of best limit orders. Order cancellations take place
mostly after the submission of best orders on the same market side, which may be
perceived as a signal of spooﬁng. We do not ﬁnd support for hypotheses (6-7). A
decrease in the bid-ask spread does not initiate submission of best limit orders. On
the contrary, they are cancelled if the bid-ask spread is large, although – possibly –
they will be resubmitted at a new and better price. An increase in volatility does
not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on order cancellations.
There are many possible extensions for our empirical study. The model can be easily
extended to more than ten competing risks and the multistate ACD model can also
be widely used in order to study other market events deﬁned on the “micro-scale”
(trades of diﬀerent volume, price changes of diﬀerent size, submissions of hidden
orders called “iceberg orders”, or the use of algo trading). If the events can be
reﬂected as an ordered point process, there is a large spectrum of possible economic
enquiries that can be investigated in this competing risk framework.
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orders (see Biais (1995); Harris (1998); Bae et al. (2003); Ranaldo (2004); Ellul et al.
(2007) and Lo & Sapp (2008)). The increase in market uncertainty, proxied by the
realized volatility, prompts market orders (especially theses to buy euro and to sell
zloty) and decreases the number of best limit orders. Order cancellations take place
mostly after the submission of best orders on the same market side, which may be
perceived as a signal of spooﬁng. We do not ﬁnd support for hypotheses (6-7). A
decrease in the bid-ask spread does not initiate submission of best limit orders. On
the contrary, they are cancelled if the bid-ask spread is large, although – possibly –
they will be resubmitted at a new and better price. An increase in volatility does
not have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on order cancellations.
There are many possible extensions for our empirical study. The model can be easily
extended to more than ten competing risks and the multistate ACD model can also
be widely used in order to study other market events deﬁned on the “micro-scale”
(trades of diﬀerent volume, price changes of diﬀerent size, submissions of hidden
orders called “iceberg orders”, or the use of algo trading). If the events can be
reﬂected as an ordered point process, there is a large spectrum of possible economic
enquiries that can be investigated in this competing risk framework.
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A Appendix
I. Properties of the Weibull distribution.
The Weibull density for the variable εi, with parameters γ>0, c = 1 (i.e. under









i.e. εi ∼ W(1,γ). The expectation of the Weibull distribution is:
µεi = Γ(1 + γ
−1) (12)
II. Main properties of the MAACD model.
Under the framework of the standard ACD model of (Engle & Russell (1998)), a
duration xi,k can be depicted as: xi,k =Φ i,kεi,k, where Φi,k =Ψ i,k ·{ Γ(1 + γ
−1
k )}−1,
Ψi,k = E(xi,k|Fi−1) and E(εi,k|Fi−1)=0 .





































The conditional cumulative density function (CDF) for xi deﬁned as xi = min{x1,i,...,x10,i}
can be derived as:
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The conditional (with respect to Fi−1 and current duration xi) transition probabil-
































































Obviously, as in the case of the asymmetric ACD model, the yi and xi are not inde-
pendent.
The conditional (only with respect to Fi−1 and not the current duration xi) transition




































Thus, yi and xi are independent.
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